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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No.  15-3931 
___________ 
 
CITY SELECT AUTO SALES INC., a New Jersey 
corporation, individually and as the representative of a class 
similarly situated persons, 
                                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BMW BANK OF NORTH AMERICA INC.; 
BMW FINANCIAL SERVICES NA LLC; 
CREDITSMARTS CORP. 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-13-cv-04595) 
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
______________ 
 
ARGUED: January 25, 2017 
 
Before:  KRAUSE, SCIRICA, and FUENTES, Circuit 
Judges. 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) appeal, a 
New Jersey automobile dealership contests the denial of class 
certification of claims brought against the consumer financing 
division of BMW and its contractor for junk faxes allegedly 
sent in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. 
The District Court denied class certification on the sole 
ground that there was no reliable and administratively 
feasible means of determining whether putative class 
members fell within the class definition. We will vacate and 
remand. 
 
I. 
 Defendant Creditsmarts Corporation operates an 
internet-based “indirect business-to-business lending tree” 
that helps independent car dealers connect customers with 
various lenders. Dealers input customer information into 
Creditsmarts’s online portal, Creditsmarts forwards the 
information to lenders based on the customer’s credit profile 
and the automobile to be purchased, and lenders may, if 
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appropriate, approve a loan for the customer. Creditsmarts 
benefits dealers by providing customers with access to 
financing options to facilitate sales and benefits lenders by 
connecting them with potential borrowers at many small 
independent dealerships. 
 
 Defendants BMW Bank of North America, Inc., and 
BMW Financial Services NA, LLC (collectively “BMW”) 
offer direct automotive financing to customers through a 
division called “up2drive.” up2drive provides financing to 
borrowers at independent car dealers for all makes and 
models of cars. 
 
 In 2012, BMW and Creditsmarts entered into a 
contract, memorialized in a Master Professional Services 
Agreement and a Marketing Agreement, under which BMW 
would offer up2drive loans to borrowers at participating 
independent car dealers through the Creditsmarts system. 
Creditsmarts agreed to “establish electronic systems to permit 
customers to communicate with up2drive through mutually 
agreed secure lines of communication” and “process all 
application forms using the minimum credit parameters 
established by up2drive and the information 
obtained . . . from the application form including the 
customer’s credit history, that will provide sufficient data to 
determine whether the customer may qualify for any loan 
programs offered . . . by up2drive.” In exchange, Creditsmarts 
would receive compensation from BMW for customers 
referred to up2drive through its system. As part of the 
marketing agreement, BMW agreed to provide “general 
institution information (including logos or Trademarks) to be 
published on the Vendor web site (Creditsmarts.com).”  
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 On a number of occasions in late 2012, Creditsmarts 
used the services of a fax broadcaster, WestFax, Inc., to fax 
advertisements to independent car dealers. The 
advertisements included the up2drive logo, identified BMW 
Bank of North America, and stated “UpToDrive is looking 
for your BUSINESS!!” A Creditsmarts employee used 
WestFax to successfully send 5,480 faxes on November 29, 
2012; 5,107 faxes on December 4, 2012; and 10,402 faxes on 
December 27, 2012 (collectively “the BMW faxes”).  
 
 To send each fax, the employee generated a list of 
recipients from Creditsmarts’s customer database. The 
customer database contains dealership contact information, 
sometimes including fax numbers, as well as information 
regarding the dealership’s relationship, if any, with 
Creditsmarts and the date the dealership was added to the 
database. After generating the recipient list from the customer 
database, the employee uploaded the list and the 
advertisement to Westfax’s online portal. Westfax then 
broadcast the fax to each recipient and billed Creditsmarts for 
each fax successfully completed. Neither Creditsmarts nor 
Westfax retained the lists of recipients of the BMW faxes.  
 
 Plaintiff City Select Auto Sales, Inc., received one of 
the faxes sent on December 27, 2012. City Select alleges that 
it had no preexisting business relationship with Creditsmarts 
or BMW and that the fax was unsolicited.  
 
 On July 30, 2013, City Select filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
asserting, inter alia, a claim under the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, and a state law claim for 
conversion based on the BMW fax. In addition to its 
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individual claim, City Select asserted claims under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of a class of other car 
dealers who received the BMW faxes. City Select sought 
certification of a class defined as: 
 
All auto dealerships that were included in the 
Creditsmarts database on or before December 
27, 2012, with fax numbers identified in the 
database who were sent one or more telephone 
facsimile messages between November 20, 
2012 and January 1, 2013, that advertised the 
commercial availability of property, goods or 
services offered by “BMW Bank of North 
America.” 
 
 During class certification discovery, City Select sought 
to compel production of the Creditsmarts database. The 
database was not preserved as of December 2012, but was 
preserved as of February 2014. City Select avers that class 
members can be identified from the 2014 database by 
determining those customers who were added to the database 
before December 2012 and who had fax numbers listed in the 
database. But City Select’s motion to compel production of 
the Creditsmarts database was denied.1  
                                              
1 The motion to compel was referred to a Magistrate Judge, 
who denied the motion without prejudice because City Select 
agreed early in the case not to seek production of the database 
before a ruling on the motion for class certification, delayed 
seeking to compel production, and given the exemplars that 
had been provided, had not shown that disclosure of the entire 
database was needed to address the certification issue. The 
Magistrate Judge specifically stated that he was not ruling on 
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 The District Court denied City Select’s motion for 
class certification on the sole ground that the proposed class 
failed to meet our Circuit’s ascertainability standard because 
there was no reliable and administratively feasible means of 
determining whether putative class members fell within the 
class definition. City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. BMW Bank of 
N. Am., Inc., Civil Action No. 13-4595, 2015 WL 5769951, at 
                                                                                                     
the relevance of the database or whether Creditsmarts’s 
proprietary interests affected disclosure. City Select did not 
appeal this ruling to the District Court, or directly raise it 
before us. City Select explained at oral argument, however, 
that it did not appeal that ruling because it believed the gist of 
the database could be ascertained from the exemplar pages 
and it did not need the complete class list prior to 
certification, but only a method for identifying the class, 
which the exemplar adequately provided.  The District Court, 
in turn, even assuming the exemplar was representative of the 
rest of the database, concluded that the City Select's class was 
not ascertainable. Although City Select’s failure to challenge 
the Magistrate Judge’s discovery ruling could be deemed a 
waiver absent exceptional circumstances, Continental Cas. 
Co. v. Dominick d’Andrea, Inc., 150 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 
1998), we conclude—in light of the procedural history here, 
the arguments City Select raised expressly contemplating 
production of the database if the class was deemed 
ascertainable based on the exemplar, and our own view of the 
centrality of the database—that even if City Select’s objection 
were not preserved through its argument, we would be 
presented here with the type of exceptional circumstance that 
would allow us to address the production of the Creditsmarts 
database and to hold, as we do today, that its production is 
required. 
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*9 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2015); see Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 
154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015). The Court concluded that “even 
though Plaintiff may be able to identify the potential universe 
of fax recipients, there is no objective way of determining 
which customers were actually sent the BMW fax.” City 
Select appealed. 
 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331 and 1367. We granted plaintiff’s petition for 
interlocutory appeal from the District Court’s order denying 
class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) 
and have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e). 
 
 “We review a class certification order for abuse of 
discretion, which occurs if the district court’s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.” In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the 
legal standard applied by the district court de novo. Id. 
 
III. 
 The question presented in this appeal is whether the 
District Court correctly determined that there was no reliable 
and administratively feasible means of determining whether 
putative class members were within City Select’s proposed 
class definition. Because we conclude the District Court erred 
in its analysis of plaintiff’s proposed method of determining 
class membership, we will vacate and remand.  
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 Every putative class action must satisfy the four 
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a): 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. See 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997). 
In addition to the Rule 23(a) requirements, a class action must 
be maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3). Only Rule 
23(b)(3) is at issue in this case, which requires plaintiff to 
meet the additional requirements of predominance and 
superiority. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615.  
 
 A Rule 23(b)(3) class must also be “currently and 
readily ascertainable based on objective criteria.” Marcus v. 
BMW of N. Am. LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012).2 To 
satisfy this standard, plaintiff must show that “(1) the class is 
‘defined with reference to objective criteria’;3 and (2) there is 
‘a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for 
determining whether putative class members fall within the 
class definition.’” Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163 (quoting Carrera v. 
Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 2013)). Plaintiff has 
                                              
2 The ascertainability standard is not applicable to Rule 
23(b)(2) classes. Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 563 (3d 
Cir. 2015). 
3 Under the objective criteria requirement, “[a] class 
definition that depends on subjective criteria, such as class 
members' state of mind, will fail for lack of definiteness.” § 
3:3.Tests for the definiteness requirement, Newberg on Class 
Actions § 3:3 (5th ed.); see Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 
256, 698 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that “defining a class by 
reference to those who ‘believe’ they were discriminated 
against undermines the validity of the class by introducing a 
subjective criterion into what should be an objective 
evaluation”). 
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the burden of making this showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and the district court must “undertake a rigorous 
analysis of the evidence to determine if the standard is met.” 
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 306; see In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 
F.3d at 318. However, plaintiff need not “be able to identify 
all class members at class certification—instead, a plaintiff 
need only show that ‘class members can be identified.’” Byrd, 
784 F.3d at 163 (quoting Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 
F.3d 349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013)) (emphasis in Byrd). 
 
 We have articulated three principal rationales for this 
standard. First, “ascertainability and a clear class definition 
allow potential class members to identify themselves for 
purposes of opting out of a class.” Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 
727 F.3d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 2013). “Second, it ensures that a 
defendant’s rights are protected by the class action 
mechanism,” id., and that “those persons who will be bound 
by the final judgment are clearly identifiable,” Marcus, 687 
F.3d at 593. Finally, “it ensures that the parties can identify 
class members in a manner consistent with the efficiencies of 
a class action.” Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307. 
 
A. 
 An examination of the various factual circumstances in 
which we have analyzed the ascertainability standard helps to 
demonstrate its contours. We first addressed this standard in 
Marcus, in which plaintiff proposed a class of New Jersey 
purchasers of BMW vehicles equipped with “run-flat tires” 
that had “gone flat and been replaced” during the class period. 
687 F.3d at 592. This definition presented several serious 
ascertainability issues. First, the vehicles in question were 
manufactured by a foreign subsidiary who was not a party to 
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the action and thus defendant did not have access to records 
of which vehicles were equipped with the defective tires. Id. 
at 593. Second, dealerships regularly replaced the run-flat 
tires with regular tires, and plaintiff did not present a method 
of obtaining records from individual dealerships. Id. at 593–
94. Finally, plaintiff limited the class to purchasers of BMWs 
whose tires had “gone flat and been replaced” and did not 
propose a method of determining who met this part of the 
class definition. Id. at 594. Because plaintiff left the answer to 
each of these questions to “potential class members’ say so,” 
we remanded to the District Court to consider “the critical 
issue of whether the defendants’ records can ascertain class 
members and, if not, whether there is a reliable, 
administratively feasible alternative.” Id.  
 
 In Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., we considered 
claims brought by a putative class of New Jersey retail 
discount club customers who purchased goods with extended 
warranties. 725 F.3d at 352. Plaintiff’s proposed class 
definition included all customers who purchased a “Service 
Plan to cover as-is products” but excluded any customers 
whose “as-is product was covered by a full manufacturer’s 
warranty, was a last-one item, consumers who obtained 
service on their product, and consumers who have previously 
been reimbursed for the cost of the Service Plan.” Id. at 353. 
We noted that this class definition required a number of 
separate factual inquiries to determine class membership: “(1) 
whether a Sam’s Club member purchased a Service Plan for 
an as-is item, (2) whether the as-is item was a ‘last one’ item 
or otherwise came with a full manufacturer’s warranty, and 
(3) whether the member nonetheless received service on the 
as-is item or a refund of the cost of the Service Plan.” Id. at 
356. We remanded so that plaintiff could propose reliable and 
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administratively feasible methods of answering these 
questions without requiring “extensive and individualized 
fact-finding.” Id. 
 
 In Carrera, the District Court certified a class 
composed of all purchasers of a particular over-the-counter 
diet supplement over several years in the state of Florida. 727 
F.3d at 304. Defendants in that case were the drug 
manufacturers, and thus did not have access to any retailer 
records that could have established which customers 
purchased the drug during the requisite time period. Id. 
Plaintiff proposed using “retailer records of online sales and 
sales made with store loyalty or rewards cards” combined 
with affidavits from potential class members. Id. But plaintiff 
had not sought, nor obtained, the proposed records during 
class discovery. Id. at 308–09. We determined that it was 
inappropriate to certify the class without further inquiry into 
the nature and extent of the available records, and remanded 
in part for this purpose. Id. at 309. In addition, we noted that, 
even if the proposed records did exist, there was no evidence 
that a “single purchaser,” let alone the whole class, could be 
identified using them. Id.. For these reasons, among others, 
we remanded so that plaintiff could conduct additional 
discovery into whether there was a reliable and 
administratively feasible means of determining class 
membership. Id. at 312. 
 
 Most recently, in Byrd we considered claims brought 
by people who leased computers with spyware that was 
installed and activated without their consent. 784 F.3d at 160. 
The class definition included both the lessees and their 
household members. Id. Defendants kept detailed records 
enabling identification of the lessees. Id. at 169. We 
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concluded that identification of the household members was 
unlikely to pose “serious administrative burdens that are 
incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class action.” 
Id. at 170 (quoting Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593). We explained 
“[a]ny form used to indicate a household member’s status in 
the putative class must be reconciled with the 895 known 
class members or some additional public records.” Id. at 171.  
 
B. 
 In this case, we will vacate and remand for two 
reasons. First, our ascertainability precedents do not 
categorically preclude affidavits from potential class 
members, in combination with the Creditsmarts database, 
from satisfying the ascertainability standard. Second, because 
the Creditsmarts database was not produced during discovery, 
plaintiff was denied the opportunity to demonstrate whether a 
reliable, administratively feasible method of ascertaining the 
class exists based, in whole or in part, on that database. 
 
 Critically, the proposed class definition in this case is 
limited to “auto dealerships that were included in the 
Creditsmarts database on or before December 27, 2012.” The 
first two principal policy rationales for the ascertainability 
standard—facilitating opt-outs and identifying persons bound 
by the final judgment—are not implicated in this case. Unlike 
the consumer classes in Marcus, Hayes, and Carrera, in 
which plaintiffs had not limited the proposed class definitions 
to the available records, the Creditsmarts database allows for 
notice directly to potential class members and limits the 
universe of potential claimants. Any recipients of the BMW 
faxes who are not included in the Creditsmarts database 
would not be bound by a hypothetical judgment. See Byrd, 
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784 F.3d at 167 (“Individuals who are injured by a defendant 
but are excluded from a class are simply not bound by the 
outcome of that particular action.”). 
 
 The District Court concluded that the class was 
nonetheless not certifiable because the Creditsmarts database 
was over-inclusive, and thus it would be impossible to 
identify class members in a reliable and administratively 
feasible way. The Court explained,  
 
It is clear from the record that the list of 
recipients of the BMW fax was generated from 
the Creditsmarts database, and although the 
database was not preserved until February 2014, 
it appears that the parties can determine from 
the database those customers that were also on 
the list in December 2012. From this subset of 
customers, the parties can eliminate those 
customers who could not have been sent the fax 
because no fax number was contained in the 
database. However, there is no evidence that the 
BMW fax was sent to every customer who had 
a fax number in the database during the relevant 
time period. 
 
This determination was based, in part, on Creditsmarts’s 
representation that its database included more entries than the 
number of BMW faxes sent in the three batches. The District 
Court concluded “there is no objective way of determining 
which customers were actually sent the BMW fax” using the 
Creditsmarts database alone.  
 
 To the extent this conclusion was based on a 
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categorical determination that the Creditsmarts database in 
combination with affidavits from potential class members 
could never satisfy the ascertainability standard, we disagree. 
Plaintiff need not, at the class certification stage, demonstrate 
that a single record, or set of records, conclusively establishes 
class membership. Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163. Rule 23 does not 
require an objective way of determining class membership at 
the certification stage, but only that there be “objective 
criteria” for class membership and a “reliable and 
administratively feasible” means of determining whether 
these criteria are met. Id.  
 
 Affidavits from potential class members, standing 
alone, without “records to identify class members or a method 
to weed out unreliable affidavits,” will not constitute a 
reliable and administratively feasible means of determining 
class membership. Byrd, 784 F.3d at 171. However, Marcus 
and our other cases do not imply “no level of inquiry as to the 
identity of class members can ever be undertaken.” Id. 
Affidavits, in combination with records or other reliable and 
administratively feasible means, can meet the ascertainability 
standard. Id. at 170–71. The conclusion that affidavits in 
combination with the Creditsmarts database categorically 
failed to meet the ascertainability standard was inconsistent 
with these precedents. 
 
 Here, the Creditsmarts database defines a limited set of 
potential claimants. The only factual inquiry required to 
determine class membership is whether a particular dealership 
in the database received the BMW fax on one of the dates in 
question. Answering this factual question of identification 
through affidavits or other available records does not 
necessarily require individualized fact-finding that would be 
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“administratively infeasible” or “a violation of Defendants’ 
due process rights.” See Byrd, 784 F.3d at 170.  
 
 We take no position on whether the level of 
individualized fact-finding in this case is administratively 
infeasible because we are limited by the record before us, 
which does not include the Creditsmarts database. The 
determination whether there is a reliable and administratively 
feasible mechanism for determining whether putative class 
members fall within the class definition must be tailored to 
the facts of the particular case. The amount of over-
inclusiveness, if any, of the proposed records is a critical 
consideration.4 
 
 The District Court’s conclusion that “there is no 
evidence that the BMW fax was sent to every customer who 
had a fax number in the database during the relevant time 
period” cannot be supported on this record. Without 
production of the database, there was no evidence in the 
record of the number of customers who both had fax numbers 
and were in the database as of December 2012. On appeal, 
Creditsmarts avers that its database includes “as many as 
31,000 auto dealerships,” but does not offer any information 
about how many of those dealerships had fax numbers and 
were added prior to the relevant period. In addition, City 
                                              
4 Even if it is true that the BMW fax was not sent to every 
customer who had a fax number in the database during the 
relevant time period, the class could still be certified, so long 
as there is a method for determining which customers did 
receive such faxes, which could be by affadavit. While a high 
degree of over-inclusiveness could prevent certification, any 
degree of over-inclusiveness will not do so. 
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Select was denied an opportunity to review the information in 
the Creditsmarts database to determine if it could be used as 
part of a reliable and administratively feasible means to 
determine class membership, combined with other records, 
with affidavits, or otherwise. 
 
 Without further information about the Creditsmarts 
database, there was not an adequate record on which to base 
the conclusion that the class was not ascertainable based on a 
“reliable and administratively feasible mechanism.” Byrd, 
784 F.3d at 163.5 We will remand so that the Creditsmarts 
                                              
5 As noted above, the District Court, even after assuming the 
database could be filtered to reflect the customers in the 
database during the appropriate time period, stated “there is 
no evidence that the BMW fax was sent to every customer 
who had a fax number in the database during the relevant 
time period.” That finding does not appear to be consistent 
with the record, which contains significant circumstantial 
evidence that the faxes were sent to every customer in the 
database at that time. For example, after the faxes went out, 
Creditsmarts’s CEO emailed BMW explaining that the “the 
employee who sent the email out to our registered dealer list” 
did it without authorization, and, at his deposition, the CEO 
testified that he understood the fax to be a “program 
update”—that is, an update meant to provide Creditsmarts’s 
“list of 31,000 auto dealerships that have registered to receive 
information regarding finance programs and compliance” 
with information that they “need[] to know when discussing 
finance options with their customers.” On remand, the 
District Court should consider this evidence in assessing 
whether the relevant portion of the database coupled with 
attestations satisfies our ascertainability standard. 
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database can be produced, subject, if appropriate, to a 
protective order and any other necessary provisions for 
confidentiality of Creditsmarts’s business information. 
 
IV. 
 Because the District Court erred in applying the 
ascertainability standard, we will vacate and remand for 
further consideration in accordance with this opinion.  
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City Select Auto Sales Inc. v. BMW Bank of North 
America Inc. et al. 
No. 15-3931 
_______________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 I agree that under our existing precedent, City Select 
must be given an opportunity to demonstrate, using the 
Creditsmarts database and affadavits from potential class 
members, that there is a reliable and administratively feasible 
means to determine whether putative class members fall 
within the class definition. I write separately because this case 
highlights the unnecessary burden on low-value consumer 
class actions created by our circuit’s adoption of a second 
ascertainability requirement. The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits have all rejected this additional requirement, 
and we should do so as well.1 
 
 Our ascertainability inquiry is a creature of common 
law. Historically, it referred only to the requirement that a 
class be defined with reference to objective criteria. But in 
                                                 
1 See Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(Rendell, J., concurring) (“[T]he lengths to which the majority 
goes in its attempt to clarify what our requirement of 
ascertainability means, and to explain how this implicit 
requirement fits in the class certification calculus, indicate 
that the time has come to do away with this newly created 
aspect of Rule 23 in the Third Circuit. Our heightened 
ascertainability requirement defies clarification. Additionally, 
it narrows the availability of class actions in a way that the 
drafters of Rule 23 could not have intended.”).  
2 
 
2012, in Marcus v. BMW of North America, LLC,2 we for the 
first time added a second requirement: that a plaintiff must 
show a “reliable, administratively feasible” mechanism to 
identify class members. Since our adoption of this new 
requirement, circuits that have carefully considered whether 
to adopt our new requirement have declined to do so.3 
                                                 
2 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012). 
3 The Fourth Circuit applied a version of the two-
requirement definition of ascertainability without analyzing 
the adoption of this second requirement. See EQT Prod. Co. v. 
Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014). The Eleventh 
Circuit has applied it in unpublished opinions.  
3 
 
                                                                                                             
 
However, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
have all expressly rejected it. See In re Petrobras Sec., No. 
16-1914-CV, 2017 WL 2883874, at *9 (2d Cir. July 7, 2017) 
(“With all due respect to our colleagues on the Third Circuit, 
we decline to adopt a heightened ascertainability theory that 
requires a showing of administrative feasibility at the class 
certification stage . . . [, which] would upset the careful 
balance of competing interests codified in the explicit 
requirements of Rule 23.”); Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
1493 (2016) (“We see no reason to follow Carrera, 
particularly given the strong criticism it has attracted from 
other courts.”); Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 
658 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1161 (2016); 
Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 
2017). In a recent opinion, the Sixth Circuit considered 
adopting the added definition of ascertainability, but 
ultimately found it unnecessary to reach this issue. See 
Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. ASD Specialty Healthcare, 
Inc., No. 16-3741, 2017 WL 2953039, at *4 (6th Cir. July 11, 
2017) (“[T]he district court’s recognition of the difficulty in 
identifying class members without fax logs and with sole 
reliance on individual affidavits was equally sufficient to 
preclude certification, regardless of whether this concern is 
properly articulated as part of ascertainability, Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance, or Rule 23(b)(3) superiority.”). 
4 
 
 As the majority explains,4 Marcus and the cases 
interpreting it have identified three values purportedly served 
by this additional ascertainability requirement—to protect:  
 
(1) absent plaintiffs’ opt-out rights and interest in not 
having future claims diluted,5  
                                                                                                             
 
The Eighth Circuit rejects the ascertainability requirement 
all together. See Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC v. Medtox Sci., 
Inc., 821 F.3d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[T]his court has not 
addressed ascertainability as a separate, preliminary 
requirement. Rather, this court adheres to a rigorous analysis 
of the Rule 23 requirements, which includes that a class ‘must 
be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.’”).  
In response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, ConAgra has 
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, seeking to have 
the Court decide whether there must be a reliable, 
administratively feasible method for identifying class 
members for a class to be certified. That petition is currently 
pending before the Court. 
4 Maj. Op. at 11. 
5 See Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593 (explaining that this 
requirement “protects absent class members by facilitating the 
‘best notice practicable’ under Rule 23(c)(2) in a Rule 
23(b)(3) action”). See also Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 
300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It is unfair to absent class members 
if there is a significant likelihood their recovery will be 
diluted by fraudulent or inaccurate claims.”). 
5 
 
(2) a defendant’s due process rights,6 and  
 
(3) the efficiency of the class action mechanism.7  
 
 In my view, the added ascertainability requirement is 
not necessary to serve any of these values. They are already 
sufficiently protected by the existing requirements of Rule 23, 
including Rule 23(b)(3) predominance and Rule 23(b)(3) 
superiority. Moreover, it undermines the “very core” of cases 
that the class action device was designed to bring to court: 
                                                 
6 Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593-94 (explaining that this 
requirement “protects defendants by ensuring that those 
persons who will be bound by the final judgment are clearly 
identifiable”). See also Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310 (“Bayer too 
has an interest in ensuring it pays only legitimate claims. If 
fraudulent or inaccurate claims materially reduce true class 
members’ relief, these class members could argue the named 
plaintiff did not adequately represent them because he 
proceeded with the understanding that absent members may 
get less than full relief. When class members are not 
adequately represented by the named plaintiff, they are not 
bound by the judgment. They could then bring a new action 
against Bayer and, perhaps, apply the principles of issue 
preclusion to prevent Bayer from re-litigating whether it is 
liable under the [statute]. Bayer has a substantial interest in 
ensuring this does not happen.” (internal citations omitted)).  
7 See Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593 (explaining that this 
requirement “eliminates serious administrative burdens that 
are incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class 
action by insisting on the easy identification of class 
members.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
6 
 
cases where many consumers have been injured, but none 
have suffered enough to make individual actions possible.8 In 
those cases, as in this case, the realistic options are collective 
action or no redress for grievances at all.  
 
 1. Absent Plaintiffs’ Opt-Out Rights and Interests  
 
 The additional requirement is apparently intended to 
protect absent class members by facilitating the “best notice 
practicable” requirement in a Rule 23(b)(3) action. This is 
said both to prevent absent class members’ recovery from 
being “diluted” by fraudulent or inaccurate claims, and to 
allow potential class members to opt out of the class. 
 
 First, the dilution concern misses the mark on the 
reality of the consumer class action landscape. Only a tiny 
fraction of eligible class members ever submit to class 
administrators in consumer cases.9 And “[t]he chances that 
someone would, under penalty of perjury, sign a false 
affidavit stating that he or she bought Bayer aspirin for the 
                                                 
8 Ebin v. Kangadis Food Inc., 297 F.R.D. 561, 567 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Rakoff, J.).  
9 See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 
3887938 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (denial of petition for 
rehearing en banc), Br. of Amici Curiae Professors of Civil 
Procedure & Complex Litigation at 9 (noting the “low historic 
claims rates” that make it unlikely that there would ever be a 
significant risk of dilution); Geoffrey C. Shaw, Note, Class 
Ascertainability, 124 Yale L.J. 2354, 2371 (2015) (“[O]f 
course it is common for only a fraction of the class members 
to ever file claims.”).  
7 
 
sake of receiving a windfall of $1.59 are far-fetched at 
best.”10 In any case, courts have tools to identify and screen 
out fraudulent claims at the claims administration stage, as 
they can rely on “claim administrators, various auditing 
processes, sampling for fraud detection, follow-up notices to 
explain the claims process, and other techniques . . . to take 
into account the size of the claims, the cost of the techniques, 
and an empirical assessment of the likelihood of fraud or 
inaccuracy.”11 Even if fraudulent claims are submitted, given 
the low participation rate generally, this is unlikely to result in 
dilution.12 This dilution concern is also inconsistent with our 
Court’s acceptance of cy pres remedies in class actions, 
allowing the distribution of unclaimed class action damages to 
                                                 
10 Byrd, 784 F.3d at 175 (Rendell, J., concurring). See also 
Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1130 (“Why would a consumer risk 
perjury charges and spend the time and effort to submit a false 
claim for a de minimis monetary recovery?”).  
11 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667. 
12 Id. (“It is of course theoretically possible that the total sum 
claimed by non-deserving claimants exceeds the total amount 
of unclaimed funds, in which case there would be dilution, 
but given the low participation rates actually observed in the 
real world, this danger is not so great that it justifies denying 
class certification altogether, at least without empirical 
evidence supporting the fear.”). 
8 
 
non-class members.13 
 
 Second, the concern about an absent plaintiff’s notice 
and opt-out rights are also misplaced. Rule 23 does not 
require actual notice to all potential class members. Instead, 
Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires the “best notice that is practicable 
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” 
Thus, the rule as written “recognizes it might be impossible to 
                                                 
13 Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1129. The cy pres doctrine has been 
applied to class actions to allow courts to distribute unclaimed 
class action damages to charitable organizations in certain 
situations. See § 12:32.Cy pres—Generally, Newberg on 
Class Actions § 12:32 (5th ed.); In re Baby Prod. Antitrust 
Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We join other 
courts of appeals in holding that a district court does not 
abuse its discretion by approving a class action settlement 
agreement that includes a cy pres component directing the 
distribution of excess settlement funds to a third party to be 
used for a purpose related to the class injury.”).  
9 
 
identify some class members for purposes of actual notice.”14 
In recognition of this impossibility, courts permit notice 
through third parties, advertising, and/or posting in places 
frequented by class members.15 Moreover, these concerns 
about an absent plaintiff’s rights are beside the point, where 
class actions are the only realistic means of vindicating a 
                                                 
14 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665. See also Byrd, 784 F.3d at 175 
(Rendell, J., concurring) (“Rule 23 requires the ‘best notice 
that is practicable under the circumstances’ to potential class 
members after a class has been certified. Potential difficulties 
in providing individualized notice to all class members should 
not be a reason to deny certification of a class. As the 
Supreme Court noted in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, due 
process is satisfied when notice is ‘reasonably calculated’ to 
reach the defined class. 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). The 
question is not whether every class member will receive 
actual individual notice, but whether class members can be 
notified of their opt-out rights consistent with due process.”). 
15 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665. See also Briseno, 844 F.3d at 
1129 (“Courts have routinely held that notice by publication 
in a periodical, on a website, or even at an appropriate 
physical location is sufficient to satisfy due process.”) (citing 
Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (holding that sticker notices on two allegedly 
offending ATMs, as well as publication in the state’s 
principal newspaper and on a website, provided adequate 
notice to class members in an action challenging ATM fees); 
Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that notice to unidentified class members by 
periodical and website satisfied due process)). 
10 
 
consumer’s rights.16 Thus, by denying class certification 
based on a fear that a prospective plaintiff will not be given 
notice to opt out and bring his own individual claim, we, “in 
effect, deprive potential class members of any recovery as a 
means to ensure they do not recover too little.”17 As Judge 
Posner put it, “[t]he realistic alternative to a class action is not 
17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a 
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”18 
 
 2. Defendants’ Due Process Rights 
 
                                                 
16 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) 
(“Economic reality dictates that petitioner’s suit proceed as a 
class action or not at all.”).  
17 Carrera, Br. of Amici Curiae Professors of Civil 
Procedure & Complex Litigation at 9. See also Briseno, 844 
F.3d at 1129 (“Practically speaking, a separate administrative 
feasibility requirement would protect a purely theoretical 
interest of absent class members at the expense of any 
possible recovery for all class members—in precisely those 
cases that depend most on the class mechanism. Justifying an 
administrative feasibility requirement as a means of ensuring 
perfect recovery at the expense of any recovery would 
undermine the very purpose of Rule 23(b)(3)—‘vindication of 
the rights of groups of people who individually would be 
without effective strength to bring their opponents into court 
at all.’” (quoting Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 617 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
18 Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th 
Cir. 2004). 
11 
 
 As a second justification, our Court has also explained 
that the added ascertainability requirement protects 
defendants by (1) ensuring that the plaintiffs bound by the 
final judgment are clearly identifiable, and (2) securing their 
due process rights to raise individual defenses and challenges. 
 
 These arguments, however, are flawed. The first 
requirement of the ascertainability test, that a class must be 
defined in reference to objective criteria, already allows 
courts to determine whether a plaintiff in a future action was a 
member of a prior class and thus is precluded from 
relitigation.19 A court can plainly read the class definition and 
make this determination. 
 
 As to a defendant’s due process rights, defendants may 
challenge a class member’s inclusion in the class and 
individual damages later in the litigation.20 A defendant may 
prefer to bring these challenges prior to class certification, 
                                                 
19 Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1130 n. 9 (“If a future plaintiff were 
to assert a claim challenging the “100% Natural” label on 
Wesson oil purchased during the class period in one of the 
eleven states at issue, that would show that she was a member 
of the class bound by the judgment. This would be so 
regardless of how ‘administratively feasible’ it was to prove 
the entirety of the membership at the class certification stage 
in this action.”) (citing Shaw, Note, Class Ascertainability, 
124 Yale L.J. at 2374-78).  
20 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 671 (“As long as the defendant is 
given the opportunity to challenge each class member’s claim 
to recovery during the damages phase, the defendant’s due 
process rights are protected.”). 
12 
 
long before the damages stage or the settlement claims 
administration stage. But a defendant does not have a due 
process right to the most “cost-effective” method for 
challenging individual claims to class membership and 
damages, and these challenges are more appropriately 
addressed after certification.21 Thus, the advisory committee 
notes to Rule 23 specifically contemplate that certification 
may be proper “despite the need, if liability is found, for 
separate determinations of the damages suffered by 
individuals within the class.”22 
 
 3. Efficiency 
 
 Finally, the added ascertainability requirement is said 
to eliminate administrative burdens that are inconsistent with 
                                                 
21 Briseno, 844 F.3d at 1132. See also Mullins, 795 F.3d at 
669 (“It is certainly true that a defendant has a due process 
right not to pay in excess of its liability and to present 
individualized defenses if those defenses affect its liability. 
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 364-65 
(2011). It does not follow that a defendant has a due process 
right to a cost-effective procedure for challenging every 
individual claim to class membership.”) (citing American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 
2309 (2013) (“the antitrust laws do not guarantee an 
affordable procedural path to the vindication of every 
claim”)). This is particularly true in cases where the size of 
the class does not change the size of the potential damage 
award. 
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 
amendment. 
13 
 
the efficiency that class actions are intended to generate. 
 
 Not so. The superiority consideration explicitly 
required by Rule 23(b)(3) already requires courts to consider 
the efficiencies of the class action mechanism before 
certifying a class. Specifically, Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the 
class device be “superior to other available methods for fairly 
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy” and considers 
“the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Thus, 
imposing a separate manageability requirement within 
ascertainability “renders the manageability criterion of the 
superiority requirement superfluous.”23  
 
 Furthermore, the superiority requirement requires 
courts to weigh the costs and benefits of certification.24 The 
heightened ascertainability requirement, however, forces 
courts to consider the costs “in a vacuum”25 without 
considering the realistic alternatives available to plaintiffs for 
                                                 
23 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663 (citing Daniel Luks, Note, 
Ascertainability in the Third Circuit: Name That Class 
Member, 82 Fordham L.Rev. 2359, 2395 (2014)). 
24 Id. at 663-64 (citing 7AA Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 1780 (“Viewing the potential administrative 
difficulties from a comparative perspective seems sound and a 
decision against class-action treatment should be rendered 
only when the ministerial efforts simply will not produce 
corresponding efficiencies. In no event should the court use 
the possibility of becoming involved with the administration 
of a complex lawsuit as a justification for evading the 
responsibilities imposed by Rule 23.”)).  
25 Id. at 663. 
14 
 
bringing their claims. In truth, in many low value consumer 
class actions, “other available methods” of vindicating a 
plaintiff’s rights will not exist.26 A district court applying our 
existing ascertainability precedent is forced to ignore this 
reality.  
 
 Moreover, this requirement understates the ability of 
district courts to manage their cases and engineer solutions at 
the claims administration stage.27 It prevents the district court 
from “wait[ing] and see[ing] how serious [a] problem may 
turn out to be after settlement or judgment, when much more 
may be known about available records, response rates, and 
                                                 
26 Even if plaintiffs could realistically bring individual suits 
instead, I cannot see what efficiencies are promoted by 
requiring numerous actions adjudicating the same legal and 
factual issues for a small amount of damages each. See 
Carnegie, 376 F.3d at 661 (“The more claimants there are, the 
more likely a class action is to yield substantial economies in 
litigation. It would hardly be an improvement to have in lieu 
of this single class action 17 million suits each seeking 
damages of $15 to $30.”). 
27 Carrera, Br. of Amici Curiae Professors of Civil 
Procedure & Complex Litigation at 7-8 (“[T]he panel decision 
conflates class certification with the claims administration 
stage of the proceedings. The ‘efficiencies’ that are promoted 
by identifying individual class members plainly relate to the 
claims administration stage. It is in connection with the 
allocation of damages between and among class members that 
there is a need to ascertain the identities of those individual 
members.”). 
15 
 
other relevant factors.”28 And decertification remains an 
option if manageability concerns overtake the efficiency of 
the class action. The mere fact that a case is complicated or 
time-consuming should not sound the death knell for 
certification. 
 
* * * 
 
 In short, our heightened ascertainability requirement 
creates an unnecessary additional burden for class actions, 
particularly the low-value consumer class actions that the 
device was designed to allow.29  
                                                 
28 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 664. See also Byrd, 784 F.3d at 175 
(Rendell, J., concurring) (“Imposing a proof-of-purchase 
requirement does nothing to ensure the manageability of a 
class or the ‘efficiencies’ of the class action mechanism; 
rather, it obstructs certification by assuming that hypothetical 
roadblocks will exist at the claims administration stage of the 
proceedings.”). 
29 Carrera, No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938, at *1 (Ambro, 
J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) 
(“Several amici—including this country’s most recognized 
expert on procedure, Arthur Miller—warn that Carrera 
threatens the viability of the low-value consumer class action 
‘that necessitated Rule 23 in the first instance.’” (quoting Br. 
of Amici Curiae Professors of Civil Procedure & Complex 
Litigation at 3)). See also Byrd, 784 F.3d at 176 (Rendell, J., 
concurring) (“The policy concerns animating our 
ascertainability doctrine boil down to ensuring that there is a 
surefire way to get damages into the hands of only those 
individuals who we can be 100% certain have suffered injury, 
16 
 
 This appeal arises because Westfax failed to retain 
records of the recipients of the alleged junk faxes. Our 
heightened ascertainability requirement encourages that 
practice. Had the Defendants not retained a version of the 
Creditsmarts database, Plaintiffs would likely have been 
unable to meet the ascertainability requirement as we have 
interpreted. Congress passed the Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act to discourage the sending of junk faxes. Our 
additional ascertainability requirement threatens to render this 
and other consumer protection statutes ineffective by creating 
loopholes for defendants who fail to retain customer records. 
 
 We should join the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits in rejecting our added ascertainability requirement. 
We should return to our original interpretation of 
ascertainability under Rule 23, and require only that a class be 
defined in reference to objective criteria. I agree with Judge 
Rendell in her critique that “[u]ntil we revisit this issue as a 
full Court or it is addressed by the Supreme Court or the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, we will continue to 
administer the ascertainability requirement in a way that 
                                                                                                             
 
and out of the hands of those who may not have. However, by 
disabling plaintiffs from bringing small-value claims as a 
class, we have ensured that other policy goals of class 
actions—compensation of at least some of the injured and 
deterrence of wrongdoing, for example—have been lost. In 
small-claims class actions like Carrera, the real choice for 
courts is between compensating a few of the injured, on the 
one hand, versus compensating none while allowing corporate 
malfeasance to go unchecked, on the other.”). 
17 
 
contravenes the purpose of Rule 23 and, in my view, disserves 
the public.”30 
                                                 
30 Byrd, 784 F.3d at 177 (Rendell, J., concurring).  
